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Telecommunication has permitted the development of what is known today as
the Global Information Infrastructure. It is generating myriad networks around the
globe through which technology is being harnessed to create a vast flow of data and
information that will enable and support applications to serve people in all aspects of
their daily lives.2 Fiber optic cables, separate satellite facilities, and regional and foreign
satellite systems have allowed for the provision of transatlantic telecommunication. In
Latin America, telephony, data, videoconferencing, fax, and telex applications constitute
the mainstay of telecommunication earth stations in the region.
3
As a consequence, satellite telecommunication can no longer be seen as a service
by itself. It is now a facilitator of economic development, a source of global competitive
advantage, a provider of social and welfare benefits, a contributor to reducing regional
disparities, and a provider of information for the general elevation of the population.
4 It
plays a critical role in foreign relations, national security, emergency and health services,
education, commerce and other economic activities. Moreover, it can be used to encour-
age self-reliance, strengthen the social fabric and sense of national identity, and con-
tribute to political stability.5 As such, satellite telecommunication is an indispensable
component of Latin America's development process.
Albeit satellite telecommunication can today link all countries, there is still a
wide disparity in the extent and quality of service and technology between industrialized
and developing countries, and within developing countries between urban and remote
areas. 6 This reflects differences in economic capability, historical experience and in the
priority given to investment in this sector. 7 The leading theory for explaining the existing
disparity is the "first come, first serve" practice of states, which has allowed for the
monopolization of the telecommunication industry by the developed countries, since the
practice was incorporated in international communications law long before a majority of
developing countries became full members of the community of nations. 8
1. Sandra Orihuela is the Resident Attorney in Latin America for Holme Roberts & Owen, LLP of
Denver, Colorado. A Peruvian national, Ms. Orihuela obtained her J.D. from the University of
Colorado in 1994. She specializes in international commercial law and practices primarily
from Lima and Buenos Aires representing U.S. investors in Latin America. Author's Note: The
author wishes to thank Druet Cameron, Assistant Librarian at Holme Roberts & Owen, L.L. P.,
for her valuable research assistance with this paper.
2. Remarks by Vice President Gore Via Satellite to the International Telecommunication Union
Plenipotentiary Conference in Kyoto, U.S. NEWSWIRE, Sept. 22, 1994, available in 1994 WL
3822295.
3. World Satellite Ground Segment Equipment Markets, Frost & Sullivan, Feb. 1996, available in
LEXIS, Nexis Library, CURNWS File.
4. See INTERNATIONAL TELECOMMUNICATION UNION, THE CHANGING TELECOMMUNICATIONS





8. See Developments in the International Law of Telecommunications, Strategic Issues for a Global
Telecommunications Market, 83 AM. SOC'Y INT'L L. PROC. 385, 390 (1989), remarks by Ram
Jakhu, University Lecturer, Faculty of Law, McGill University [hereinafter Jakhu].
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In this context, Latin American countries are faced with a traditional interna-
tional telecommunication system which does not protect their interests since they did not
participate in its formulation. 9 These countries have, however, recognized the need to
become active players in the formulation and development of international law to regu-
late telecommunication. More specifically, their participation in the regulation of space
and satellite telecommunication, which are the lifeblood of all other international com-
munication, is essential. In an attempt to narrow the broad spectrum of international
telecommunication regulation and development, this paper concentrates on satellite
telecommunication in Latin America. It analyzes the most important factors affecting
Latin America's satellite telecommunication development. The first factor is the major
players influencing satellite telecommunication policy in the region, which include
regional agreements such as NAFTA. The second factor is a number of issues particular
to the region which are affecting satellite telecommunication in Latin America. The
interaction of these players and issues has begun to reshape the traditional international
telecommunication system to include the particular interests and needs of Latin
American countries with respect to telecommunication. Given its strong commitment to
achieving a balance between its telecommunication development and regulatory frame-
work, Peru's telecommunication development experience is used as an example through-
out this paper.
II. Major Players Affecting Satellite Telecommunication in Latin America.
Satellites have proven to be one of the most effective and competitive ways to
communicate, whether by voice, computer, fax or video by anyone from anyplace at any-
time to anywhere on the planet. 1° In 2001, Latin America is forecasted to take 22.3% of
the world's fixed satellite ground segment equipment market.11 Today, satellite service
providers attempt to satisfy the needs of Latin America's eighty milion-plus television
households. Changes in the regulatory environment, most notably in Argentina, Chile,
Colombia, Mexico and Venezuela have opened up new markets, attracted foreign invest-
ment and increased competition. 12 Still, regulation and development of satellite telecom-
munication in the region is strongly dependent on the practices of several international
players. An introduction of the major players and their activities follows.
A. ITU.
The International Telecommunications Union ("ITU") is a specialized agency
of the United Nations and an intergovernmental organization of 169 member countries,
9. Id.
10. See Press Release, infra note 86, quoting C. Michael Armstrong, Chairman and Chief Executive
Officer of Hughes Electronics.
i1. World Satellite Ground Segment Equipment Market supra note 3.
12. Id.
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founded in 1865 to unify the regulation and use of telecommunications. 13 Currently,
the ITU establishes technical standards, regulations, and operating procedures for the
industry.14 It has also steadily increased its authority over satellite communications by
establishing new international legal norms to ensure the uniform and undisputed use of
this resource. 15
By sharing information, developing standards, and adopting regulatory provi-
sions that represent the common rules of the business, the Geneva-based ITU has played
a unique part in the development of today's worldwide telecommunications network. 16
It was, however, established to service the interests of national governments and tele-
phone operator monopolists.
The accelerated trend towards the privatization and liberalization of markets,
the fact that technological convergence has eroded the once stable borderlines between
broadcasting, telecommunication and computing, in addition to wealth creation and
competitive edge seen as dependent on the efficient use of telecommunication and infor-
mation technology, forced the ITU to adapt to a new and dramatically shifting environ-
ment 17 To this end, the ITU created a High Level Committee ("HLC") in 1991 to review
how the ITU should be structured to survive a changing telecom environment.
One of the key issues before the HLC was the special needs of developing coun-
tries or LDCs. Since the early 1960s, the LDCs had been active in the ITU to attempt to
improve and democratize its functioning and to effect an equitable sharing of two areas
recognized as limited natural resources - the radio frequencies and the GSO posi-
tions.18 Although the LDCs have been relatively successful in the democratization and
improvement of the functioning of the ITU, their efforts to establish an international
regulatory regime for equitable sharing of radio frequencies and an orbital position have
been less successful. 19
13. ITU Policy, supra note 4, at 1.
14. Id.
15. Id., citing International Communications Convention, Nov. 12, 1965, 18 U.S.T. 575. Until the
enactment of the 1992 Constitution and Convention, the ITU operated on the basis of an
International Convention which was periodically elaborated by Plenipotentiary Conferences,
taking place every five to ten years, in the form of an international treaty among its members.
Id. The basic structure of the ITU dates back to the late 1940s and consisted of five permanent
organs: The General Secretariat, which includes the Technical Cooperation Department, the
International Frequency Registration Board, the International Consultative Committees
(CCITT), and the Telecommunications Development Bureau, created in 1989 in recognition of
the significance of telecommunications development to a country's economic and social stabil-
ity. Id. In 1993, the standarization activities of the CCITT and the International Radio
Consultative Committee (CCIR) were grouped together in the telecommunications standariza-
tion sector. The other activities of the CCIR (mainly tasks linked to the rational management
of the radioelectric frequency spectrum in terrestrial and space telecommunications) were
integrated in a new radiocomunication sector.
16. Denis Gilhooly, Need for Dynamism - Profile, The International Telecommunication Union, FIN.
TIMES LTD., Oct. 7,1991 [hereinafter ITU Dynamism].
17. Id.
18. Jakhu, supra note 8, at 385.
19. Id
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ITU's initial response to LDC's concerns was the creation of the
Telecommunications Development Bureau (the "BTD") at the Nice 1989 Plenipotentiary
Conference, with its primary function to promote worldwide telecommunications devel-
opment.20 As a result of the BTD, the ITU's mandate was expanded to comprise four dis-
tinct goals - international interoperability of national communication networks, equi-
table management of the radio frequency spectrum, management of the geostationary
satellite orbits, and telecommunication development. 21
This initial response to LDC's concerns was, however, handicapped by the ITU's
internal bureaucracy and the fact that it continued to operate under procedures that were,
in many cases, more than fifty years old.22 In practice, failure to react quickly to the new
environment led organizations such as the European Community, the Organization for
Economic Cooperation and Development, and the General Agreement on Tariffs and
Trade to encroach on ITU activities.23
The ITU has since taken a number of steps to strengthen its international role.
ITU's new Constitution and Convention, signed in 1992 and in force since 1994, replaced
the ITU Convention signed in Nairobi in 1982 and represents ITU's first basic instrument
intended to be permanent. The 1994 Plenipotentiary Conference restructured the ITU
under three new goals: development, standarization and radiocommunications. 24
Further, the World Telecommunications Advisory Council was created in 1992 to advise
the ITU's Secretary General from public and private sector perspectives. 25 This Business
Advisory Forum or WorldTel was established in recognition that the industry is now less
government and more business oriented. Its mission is to provide financial assistance,
access to financial sources, leading edge technologies and management practices, neutrali-
ty in providing systems, and information and advisory practices.26
The ITU restructuring and its leading participation in telecommunication policy
and development is beginning to allow LDCs to take on a much more important role in
the formulation of telecommunication policy and in strengthening telecommunication
development in their own countries. For instance, the HLC recognized that multilateral
institutions provided only about five percent of the resources needed for telecoms devel-
20. See Brian Harris, The New Telecommunication Development: Bureau of the International
Telecommunications Union, 7 AM. U.J. INT'L. L. & POL'Y 83 (1991). The specific duties of the
BTD include: (i) educating policy makers on the importance of telecommunication; (ii) work-
ing with national, regional, and international bodies to promote the growth of telecommuni-
cation; (iii) seeking private industry's participation in telecommunication development; and
(iv) assisting in the formulation of a general plan for telecommunication development and
supporting development conferences. Id. at 90-91.
21. Id. at 89-90.
22. See ITU Dynamism, supra note 16.
23. Id.
24. ITU Takes on New Structure, EUROPE INFO. SERv. TECH., Feb. 4, 1993, available in LEXIS, Nexis
Library, ARCNWS File.
25. See, International Telecommunication Union Starts Fund for Communications in Developing
Countries, COMPUTERGRAM INTERNATIONAL, Feb. 23, 1995, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library,
CURNWS File [hereinafter ITU Fund].
26. Id.
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opment.2 7 The funds in trust received by the BTD were themselves insufficient to cover
BTD's projects and created a funding gap of more than U.S. $30,000m each year.2 8 In
1995, the ITU's WorldTel set up an investment fund for joint telecommunication ventures
in developing countries with a program to finance two or three pilot projects in the initial
years worth about U.S. $40 to $50 million each, and to fund some U.S. $200 to $500 mil-
lion worth of projects in LDCs. 29 Similarly, the Radiocommunciations Bureau was called
upon for the review of current procedures relating to the coordination and planning of
satellite devices, due to the recognition that more work was needed to study the technical
sharing criteria for the LEOs and GEOs and terrestrial networks, as well as the need to
better match notification of satellites with satellites actually launched. 30 In response to
the problem of accounting rates for LDCs, it was agreed at the 1994 Plenipotentiary
Conference that the network quality and telephone penetrations to developed country
levels would assist in diminishing existing call and cost imbalances. 3 1 It was further
decided that where bilateral agreements are reached on revenue sharing on a basis other
than 50/50 to the advantage of developing countries, the resulting additional revenues
should be used by developing countries to improve their networks and services.
32
B. INTELSAT.
In 1964, two years after passage of the U.S. Communications Satellite Act
("Satellite Act"), the United States and ten other nations entered into an interim executive
agreement that created the International Telecommunications Satellite Organization
("Intelsat"). 33 The parties to that Agreement, "desired...to continue the development of
[a] telecommunications satellite system with the aim of achieving a single global com-
mercial telecommunications satellite system as part of an improved global telecommuni-
cations network which will provide expanded telecommunications services to all areas of
the world and which will contribute to world peace and understanding,..." 34
The member-nations later executed two additional executive agreements formal-
izing the ground rules for Intelsat's control and management of the international satellite
network and related support facilities. 35 These agreements are known as the Definitive
Agreement and the Operating Agreement (collectively, the "Intelsat Agreements"). The
Definitive Agreement was executed by the government of each member-nation and estab-
27. Vineeta Shetty, ITU in Mid-Flutter, International Telecommunication Union, COMMUNICATIONS
INTERNATIONAL, Nov. 1, 1994.
28. ITU Fund, supra note 25.
29. Id.
30. Id. Shetty, supra note 27.
31. ITU Fund, supra note 25.
32. Id.
33. See Agreement Establishing Interim Arrangements for a Global Commercial Communications
Satellite System, Aug. 20, 1964, 15 U.S.T. 1705.
34. See Agreement Relating to the International Telecommunications Satellite Organization
"Intelsat," Aug. 20, 1971, 23 U.S.T. 3813, 3814.
35. Alpha Lyracom Space Communications, Inc. v. Communications Satellite Corp., 946 F.2d 168, 170
(1992) (citing 47 U.S.C. § 702(a)(1991). [hereinafter Alpha Lyacom].
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lished a three-tiered organizational structure for Intelsat, comprising the Assembly of
Parties, the Meeting of Signatories, and the Board of Governors. Each member-nation or
"party"3 6 has a seat on the Assembly of Parties, and each designated "signatory" 3 7 to the
Operating Agreement is represented in the Meeting of Signatories and the Board of
Governors. The United States designated the State Department as its representative to the
Assembly of Parties and Comsat Corporation ("Comsat") as its signatory and representa-
tive to the Meeting of Signatories.
Intelsat's importance to international telecommunication is due to its ownership
and operation of the world's largest network of satellites, 38 which provides international
telecommunications services such as phone, telex, television broadcasting, and data trans-
missions, on a commercial "global and nondiscriminatory basis." 3 9 The Intelsat
Agreements give Intelsat virtually plenary authority to set rates for use of Intelsat satellite
capacity, to approve Intelsat's purchases of goods and services, and to approve proposals
to establish international and domestic telecommunications satellite systems separate
from Intelsat. 40
Most important to Latin America's satellite telecommunication development is
that under the Intelsat Agreements the member nations that authorize international satel-
lite systems separate from Intelsat are required to ensure that such systems are technically
compatible with the Intelsat system and will not cause significant economic harm to it.
During 1990, Intelsat initiated certain reforms to its process for coordinating with these
separate satellite systems, which were superseded in November 1992 and again in October
36. The function of the member-nations' parties to the Intelsat is to make recommendations to
other affiliates of the organization as well as to conduct consultations for any member-nation
wishing to establish (or use) non-Intelsat systems. See Paula Brillson, The Empire Strikes Back
in the International Satellite Telecommunications Industry, 18 RUTGERS COMPUTER & TECH. L.J.
381, n.35, citing Intelsat Agreement, Aug. 20, 1971, art. XIV(d), 23 U.S.T. 3813, 3854. In the
event that any member-nation wished to establish a separate international satellite system, pro-
cedures have been set forth to permit the creation of additional systems. Id. The procedures
are commonly referred to as the article XIV(d) consultations. Id. New system proposals are
assessed on the basis of technical compatibility with the Intelsat system and showing that the
use of a separate system will not produce an adverse economic impact upon Intelsat. Id.
37. The powers and duties of the signatories are, in part, to participate in the actual ownership and
commercial exploitation of Intelsat satellites, and to promote the policies and interests of its
represented member country. Id. at n. 389. Apportionment of Intelsat shares is determined by
the level of use of the Intelsat facilities. Id. at n. 40. Ownership has been dominated by the sig-
natories of both the United States (Comsat) and Great Britain (British Telecom) since the for-
mation of Intelsat. Id.
38. Id. at 382. A communications satellite system, like Intelsat, is similar to a sophisticated elec-
tronic mirror suspended in a stationary orbital position thousands of miles above the equator.
Id. at n. 4 (citing Edward S. Binkowski, SATELLITE INFORMATION SYSTEMS 14 (1988). Broadcasters
are to transmit signals (uplinks) from the earth which are bounced off the satellite's mirrored-
liked surface (the transponders) and redirected to earth (downlinks) to a receiving station. Id.
39. Brillson, supra note 36, at 382.
40. Alpha Lyracom, 946 F.2d at 170.
Winter 1997 49
1994.41 Under the streamlined procedures approved in 1992, carriage by separate systems
of any amount of traffic or services not interconnected to the public-switched network
and of up to 1,250 circuits of public-switched traffic per satellite is presumed not to cause
significant economic harm to the Intelsat system. 42 The 1,250 threshold was raised in
1994 to 8,000 circuits of public-switched traffic per satellite. 43 In addition, in 1994
Intelsat approved further liberalization of coordination procedures with a view toward
eliminating the economic harm test in the 1997-98 time frame.44
Today, 137 governments are members of Intelsat through their designated repre-
sentatives. 45 The recent and increasing efforts for the privatization and restructuring of
Intelsat, however, are likely to affect satellite telecommunication development in Latin
America. Comsat, the U.S. signatory to Intelsat, reached an agreement with the U.S.
Government in February, 1996 concerning a joint proposal that would transfer approxi-
mately 50% of Intelsat's assets, including satellites, to a new commercial affiliate. 4 6 The
proposal must be approved by two thirds of the 137 governments that are members of the
Intelsat before it may be implemented, and should be considered for adoption at the next
Intelsat Assembly of Parties in 1997.
4 7
C. COMSAT.
The United States Congress enacted the Communications Satellite Act of 1962
("Satellite Act") to implement the national policy of establishing "in conjunction and in
cooperation with other countries, as expeditiously as practicable, a commercial commu-
nications satellite system."48 Rather than relying solely on governmental efforts, Congress
sought to "provide for the widest possible participation by enterprise," 49 by creating the
Communications Satellite Corporation, known today as COMSAT Corporation
("Comsat"), a publicly-held, private corporation to act subject to appropriate govern-
mental regulation, as the "United States participant in the global system." 50 Under the
Satellite Act, Comsat assumed responsibility for planning, constructing, and operating the
satellite system, including satellite terminal stations,51 "itself or in conjunction with for-
41. See COMSAT CORPORATION, 1995 10-K Annual Report 6 (1995), available in LEXIS, CORP




45. Id. As of December 31, 1995, total Intelsat's Owners Equity was approximately $1.87 billion,




48. Alpha Lyracom, 846 F.2d at 170.
49. 47 U.S.C. § 701(c) (1996).
50. Id. §§ 731, 734(1), 701(c).
51. Id. § 735(a)(3).
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Until 1985, Comsat was, with minor exceptions, the sole United States provider
of international satellite communications services using the Intelsat system. At that time,
however, the FCC authorized the establishment of separate U.S. international communi-
cations satellite systems that would compete with Intelsat. There are various separate U.S.
based international communications satellite systems (i.e. Orion, Panamsat and
Columbia), INTERSPUTNIK, a Russian based international system and a number of
regional and foreign satellite systems around the world currently competing with Comsat.
The importance of Comsat to satellite development in Latin America lies not
only in the fact that Comsat has the largest investment share in Intelsat, but because it
also has a wide range of investments in worldwide commercial operations which include
several joint ventures and other operations in several Latin American countries. On a
more recent front, a major part of Comsat's international telecommunications strategy is
the investment of approximately $150 Million in I-CO Global Communications
(Holdings) Limited ("ICO"). ICO plans to build and operate spacecraft and related ter-
restrial facilities for the provision of worldwide mobile communications via handheld
devices. ICO's intermediate circular orbit satellite system will have 12 satellites and is
scheduled to become operational by the year 2000. ICO users are expected to communi-
cate worldwide using handheld units similar to cellular phones.
D. ANDEAN SATELLITE SYSTEM.
In 1991, the Andean Telecommunications Commission authorized the State
Telecommunication Firms Association (ASETA) to reach a bridging agreement with
Intelsat to provide satellite communications capability for Latin America into the 21st cen-
tury.53 In December, 1992, the Intelsat Council of Governors approved the reservation of
sufficient satellite capacity for the ASETA members to enter into a fifteen-year contract
beginning in 1995. 5 4 The proposed new range of Intelsat VII satellites to be used under its
provisions. These spacecrafts are twice as powerful as the existing Intelsat systems and
would meet both existing and anticipated public satellite communications service
demands for the region and do it via smaller earth stations than are now in use.
55
52. Id. § 735(a)(1).
53. See Stewart Wittering, Footprints to Overlap in South America; Establishment of Regional
Telecommunications Networks, INT'L THOMSON PUB. LTD. 47 (U.K.) (1993), available in LEXIS,




In addition, the Andean Commission for Telecommunication Tariffs ("CATT")
has begun the process of tariff harmonization. Standarized tariffs for intra-regional tele-
phone and telex traffic between the five CATT member states were introduced in 1991.56
Standarization of data traffic is also under way in Peru, Colombia and Venezuela, which
are already operating under a harmonized charge rate structure.5 7
E. INMARSAT.
The third major satellite communications force in the Latin American region is
Inmarsat.58 Inmarsat, however, concentrates on mobile services, and is therefore not in
direct competition with either Intelsat or Panamsat.
Inmarsat is comprised of seventy-nine nations and is headquartered in London.
Inmarsat operates under three agreements: (i) an intergovernmental convention; (ii) a
headquarters agreement with the U.K. government; and (iii) an operation agreement
signed by each nation's government or designated telecommunications entity
(signatory). 59 Comsat is the U.S. signatory.
Inmarsat has been a presence in Latin America since 1982 with seven member
states: Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Peru, Colombia, Panama and Cuba. 60 Venezuela, Costa
Rica, and the Bahamas were aspirant members as of 1993.61 Mexico became a member of
Inmarsat in early 1994. Inmarsat provides services in 34 of the 46 countries in the region
and has a single dedicated earth station in Tangua, Brazil.6 2 Inmarsat provides access to
PSTN services throughout the region via Comsat, IDB, and Teleglobe earth stations. In
addition, Inmarsat may also expand its switched satellite services for small communities
since it is already doing so, on a private basis, for the Galapagos Islands and due to system
trailing appearing imminent in other countries. 63
Intergovernmental proceedings under the procedures of Inmarsat are now
underway to debate privatization of Inmarsat as well as other possible alternative struc-
tures favored by other member nations of the organization. 64 The privatization efforts
are based on some of the members belief, particularly Comsat's, that if Inmarsat is con-
verted into a commercial enterprise responsible to shareholders and without the gover-
nance and cost structure associated with international treaty organizations, it will be










64. See Comsat 10-K Report, supra note 41, at 11.
65. Md.
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F. PANAMSAT.
The operations of Alpha Lyracom or Pan American Satellite, L.P. ("PanAmSat")
as the company to market and operate the first international commercial communica-
tions satellite outside of Intelsat are significant to satellite telecommunication regulation
and development in Latin America. The actions undertaken by PanAmSat to accomplish
its current status can be a precedent not only to private parties interested in operating
outside of Intelsat, but for the emerging local telecommunication provider with respect to
expiration of the exclusivity period that the successors of privatized telecommunication
operators now enjoy in some Latin American countries.
Beginning in 1983, several United States companies, including PanAmSat, lob-
bied the Federal Communications Commission for permission to establish non-Intelsat
international telecommunications satellite systems.66 The U.S. Communications Satellite
Act made only a passing reference to competing satellite systems, authorizing the
President to explore the possibility of "a separate communications satellite system" where
"required to meet unique governmental needs" or where "otherwise required in the
national interest.' 67 Article XIV(d) of Intelsat's Definitive Agreement gave Intelsat's gov-
erning bodies the authority to approve proposals establishing international and domestic
telecommunications satellite systems separate from Intelsat. In particular, an applicant
for a separate system providing international satellite service must engage in "consulta-
tions" with the Assembly of Parties and the Board of Governors to ensure the technical
compatibility of its system with Intelsat and to guard against the possibility that the com-
peting system might result in significant economic harm to Intelsat.
In 1984, President Reagan, acting pursuant to §§ 701(d) and 721(a) of the
Satellite Act, issued Presidential Determination No. 85-2, declaring separate international
communications satellite systems to be "in the national interest" and directing the
Secretary of State and the Secretary of Commerce to "inform the FCC of criteria neces-
sary to ensure [that] the United States" fulfills its obligation to consult with the appropri-
ate Intelsat bodies regarding competing satellite systems.
68
The Departments of State and the Department of Commerce jointly procribed
that each alternative system "be restricted to providing services through the sale or long-
term lease of transponders or space segment capacity for communication not intercon-
nected with public-switched message networks" and that "one or more foreign authorities
[were] to authorize use of each system and enter into consultation procedures with the
66. Alpha Lyracom, 946 E2d at 171.
67. Id. at 172 (citing47 U.S.C. § 721(a)(6)).
68. Id. at 172 (citing49 Fed. Reg. 46, 987 (1984)).
Winter 1997 53
United States Party under Article XIV(d) of the Intelsat Definitive Agreement to ensure
technical compatibility and to avoid significant economic harm" 69 to Intelsat.
Following Article XIV(d) consultations, PanAmSat obtained approval from
Intelsat's Assembly of Parties to provide international satellite services to the United
Kingdom, Germany, Ireland, and several Central and South American Countries. 70
PanAmSat also received favorable findings from the Board of Governors following Article
XIV consultations for the provision of domestic satellite services to the United Kingdom
and Chile.
PanAmSat's activities, however, were restricted to non-PSN networks. Therefore,
PanAmSat was prohibited from carrying any traffic interconnected with the public-
switched network (PSN). In 1990, PanAmSat challenged the non-PSN restriction by fil-
ing a Petition for Rulemaking with the FCC.71 It argued that "by protecting Intelsat's
monopoly in the provision of international switched services via satellite, the U.S. govern-
ment [was] protecting, not U.S. interests, but the interests of Intelsat's owners, the foreign
communications monopolies that were overcharging U.S. telephone consumers by as
much as $1 billion' 72 Moreover, PanAmSat argued that by limiting the ability of these
"nascent competitors" to expand their service offerings at lower prices, the PSN restric-
tion runs counter to the stated U.S. policy of encouraging a pluralistic, competitive over-
seas environment, which would ideally open markets to United States exporters of
telecommunications goods and services. 73
69. Id. at 172 (citing letter from Secretary of State George P. Schultz and Secretary of Commerce
Malcolm Bladridge to Chairman Mark S. Fowler of the Federal Communications Commission
(Nov. 28, 1984)). The Foreign Relations Authorization Act (FRAA), Fiscal Years 1986 and
1987, Pub. L. No. 99-93, 99 Stat. 405, 425-26 (1985), ratified the procedures set forth in the
Definitive Agreement and in the subsequent Executive Branch directives on competing satellite
systems. Id. Expanding on § 721(a) (6) of the Communications Satellite Act, the FRAA
declared the policy of the United States to make available, in addition to satellite services utiliz-
ing Intelsat facilities, "any additional such facilities...found to be in the national interest" and
that also met the dual requirements of technical feasibility and avoidance of economic harm
set forth in Article XIV(d) of the Definitive Agreement. Id. (citing § 146(a)(2)). The FRAA
also made compliance with the requirements set forth in Presidential Determination No. 85-2
and the requirement that "one or more foreign authorities have authorized the use of such sys-
tem consistent with such conditions" a precondition of consultation with Intelsat. Id. (citing §
156(b)(1), (2)).
70. Id. at 172.
71. See Pan American Satellite, Petition for Rulemaking to Provide for Fully Competitive Services,
Including Services Interconnected with the Public Switched Network, 328 PLI/Pat 611,628 (1990)
[hereinafter PanAmSat Petition].
72. Id. Further, PanAmSat explained that...the PSN restriction also has placed obstacles in the path
of the new, private telecommunications entrepreneurs outside of the U.S. in many countries,
deregulation of telecommunication is advancing, and the PSN restriction has prevented the
new entrepreneurs in these countries from using PanAmSat facilities to compete with the PTTs
in offering international services. Id. at 699.
73. Id.
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Thereafter, the State Department made a decision to relax the ban preventing
private satellite companies from providing services that interconnect with the PSTNs by
allocating 100 circuits for their use. 74 While the concession was small, it was a step
toward liberalizing the regulatory structure of the satellite industry.75 In late 1993, the
FCC substantially eliminated prior restrictions on access of separate system satellite oper-
ators to the PSTN. This action, along with the FCC's goal of eliminating all restrictions
on separate systems by 1997, will undoubtedly increase competition and support the
development of additional separate systems throughout the world.
While PanAmSat was successful with regard to the PSN, it felt Comsat restricted
its operations. This claim provides a useful example as to what a local provider in one of
the Latin American countries is likely to face if it chooses, in the near future, to challenge
the successor of the government telecommunication monopoly, which is in many
instances the new local government representative in Intelsat, and is likely to play a role
similar to Comsat's.
In 1989, PanAmSat filed an antitrust lawsuit against Comsat, amended in 1993
pursuant to the court's recommendation, alleging that Comsat violated antitrust laws in
pursuing business activities outside its role as a signatory of Intelsat.76 In other words, by
acting as a common carrier and not in its role as an international organization, Comsat
violated anti-trust laws. The alleged violations included boycotting and refusing to enter
into agreements with PanAmSat to provide international satellite services, conspiring to
acquire and market transponders on competing satellites, thereby interfering with
PanAmSat's business plans, procuring agreements from foreign companies to refuse to
deal with PanAmSat or its customers, and conspiring to suppress international satellite
data business by refusing to authorize customer earth stations for the sole purpose of pre-
serving the telecommunication monopolies. 77
In 1994, PanAmSat amended the lawsuit to include GTE Corporation and four-
teen European, Caribbean and Latin American telecommunications companies as defen-
dants.78 PanAmSat alleged that these companies had conspired with Comsat to monopo-
lize international telecommunications satellite services.79 Discovery in the lawsuit pro-
duced in excess of 330,000 pages of documents between the parties, and an additional
57,000 pages from nineteen third parties.80 Although discovery ended in 1994,
PanAmSat filed motions for additional discovery. In December 1994, Comsat filed a
motion for summary judgement seeking the court to dismiss all claims. On September 4,
74. Brillson, supra note 36, at 390, n.46.
75. Id. at 390, n.46 (citing 52 Companies back PanAmSat's request for PSTN Interconnection, FIN.
TIMES LTD., Feb. 21, 1991, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, FTTEL File.
76. Alpha Lyracom, 946 F.2d at 170.
77. See Comsat Appealsfor Privatization, SATELLITE COMMUN., April, 1994, at 10.
78. Id. The suit named as new defendants telecommunication companies from Germany, the
United Kingdom, France, Spain, the Dominican Republic, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Venezuela,
Guatemala, Jamaica, Barbados and Trinidad and Tobago. Id.
79. Id.
80. Alpha Lyracom Space Communications, Inc., Reynold v. Aselmo, Pan American Satellite, and
PanAmSat, L.P. v. Comsat Corporationist, 1996 WL 502347 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 5, 1996).
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1996, PanAmSat's discovery motions were denied and Comsat's motion for summary
judgement was granted as to all claims. 81
Today, PanAmSat has four operational satellites, two of which service Latin
America, two under construction, and two more on order. Beyond the PAS-8, PanAmSat
has requested FCC approval to launch several additional satellites, including two Pan-
American services and several that will use emerging transmissions frequencies for com-
mercial services. 82 PanAmSat's first satellite, the PAS-1, was launched in 1988 for service
over the Atlantic Ocean region and is now the leading satellite for television and cable
programming distribution in Latin America. 83 The PAS-3 satellite (a replacement for a
satellite lost as a result of a launch failure in December 1994) was launched on January
12, 1996 and commenced service on February 19, 1996 over the Atlantic Ocean Region.
8 4
In addition, PanAmSat is heavily involved in direct-to-home ("DTH") television services
and is the primary satellite service provider for the Latin America DTH effort led by the
world's top producers of Spanish-language, Portuguese-language, and other international
programming. 8
5
On September 20, 1996 PanAmSat and Hughes Electronics Corporation
announced an agreement to merge their respective satellite services operations into a new
publicly held company to be named PanAmSat Corporation. 86 The deal was valued at $3
billion and created a dominant force in the satellite industry, second only to Intelsat.
8 7
The new company will combine HCG's fleet of ten communication satellites for the U.S.
market with PanAmSat's international fleet of four. The strategic combination creates a
prime service provider of satellite based communication services and will undoubtedly
reshape the satellite telecommunication service industry in Latin America.
81. Id. On a similar trend, Comsat Corp. announced in March, 1996 that it had filed suit against
News Corp Ltd. (NWS), PanAmSat Corp. and Grupo Televisa S.A., over NWS's alleged breach
of a contract to lease capacity on a Comsat satellite. Comsat alleged that PanAmSat and Grupo
Televisa "induced" NWS to violate the contract, and "conspired to benefit themselves by
arranging for PanAmSat to provide the service in Comsat's place." See Sued by Comsat Corp.,
S&P DAILY NEWS, March 15, 1996, available in WESTLAW.




86. Press release, Hughes, PanAmSat Agree to Merge Satellite Services Operations, Sept. 20, 1996,
available in WESTLAW-ASAP-C.file.
87. Hughes Buys PanAmSat for $3B, AP ONLINE, Sept. 20, 1996. The Hughes Communications
Galaxy (HCG) business of Hughes Electronics was to be combined with PanAmSat to form
PanAmSat Corporation. Id. In connection with the transaction, PanAmSat stockholders would
receive an aggregate $1.5 billion in cash and 28.5 percent of the new company. Id. In addition,
Grupo Televisa S.A., a PanAmSat shareholder, would repurchase PanAmSat's options to obtain
equity interests in the DTH ventures in the Americas and the Iberian Peninsula. Id.
Immediately after the merger, Hughes will own 71.5% of the new PanAmSat. The transaction
requires government review and receipt of other approvals, including that of the FCC, which
are expected to be completed within six to twelve months. Id.
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G. NAFTA AND OTHER REGIONAL AGREEMENTS.
An important area affecting telecommunications is the potential effect of bilat-
eral and multilateral agreements. These agreements may afford telecommunication
providers increased access to the Latin American market and privileges not granted to
nonparties to those agreements.
For example, the Andean Common Market ("ACM") is committed to promoting
the importation of technology to its member countries by facilitating license contracts for
technology, technical assistance, technical services, basic engineering and other technologi-
cal contracts as defined in the legislation of each country.88 Similarly, the Latin American
Association for Integration ("AILADI") created an economic preference area, whereby tariff
reductions were negotiated by the participating parties.89 ALADI has allowed for the con-
vergence of Latin American countries which have certain mutual interests and a certain
degree of economic capability, such as Brazil and Argentina.90 Uruguay and Paraguay
joined the free trade process in 1991 by signing the Treaty of Mercosur.
The United States supports the Mercosur process, which provides access to a
$420 billion market and aims at total tariff removal, and agreed to negotiate a free trade
area with the group as a bloc once the integration process is completed. 9 1 Mexico is
negotiating its adhesion to NAFTA within the ALADI, since according to article 44 of the
Treaty of Montevideo 92 any preferential tariff treatment granted to a third country (non-
member state) shall be automatically extended to ALADI member states. 93
In addition, the North America Free Trade Agreement ("NAFTA") is of special
importance to telecommunication development in Latin America. Chapter 13 of NAFTA
88. See Decision 291, Andean Common Market, 5 I.L.M. 150-156 (1992). The Andean Common
Market has as its principal goal "the growing convergence between the economic policies of its
member countries in the search for greater efficiency and competitive position through liberal-
ization of trade and international investment, in line with the interest of [its] countries and the
implementation of economic rationalization based on private initiative, fiscal discipline and a
new and efficient structure in the State." Id. at 154, Chapter IV, Art. 12.
89. See Umberto Celli Junior, Mercosur: an Opportuniry for Investment, INT'L Bus. LAWYER (1992)
at 480.
90. Id.
91. Id. at 481.
92. Id. The Treaty of Montevideo emerged in 1960 to establish the Latin American Association for
Free Trade (ALALC), which was to create a free trade zone within the territory of its member
states, namely: Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, Mexico, Paraguay, Peru,
Uruguay and Venezuela. Id. However, this organization had little success, primarily because of
the different economic, political and social levels of its members. Id. The signing of the Treaty
of Montevideo in 1980 changed the integration process, setting forth more realistic terms and
conditions, new flexible instruments and mechanisms, thereby creating ALADI. Id.
93. Id.
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is devoted to trade and investment in telecommunication equipment and services. 94
Chapter 13 provides, inter alia, equal access to and use of any public transportation net-
work or service offered in a signatory's territory, nondiscriminatory licensing and permit
procedures for value-added or enhanced services (e.g., data and facsimile networks),
nondiscriminatory assessment and testing procedures for regulating the telecommunica-
tions industry, and harmonization and liberalization of standards-setting procedures for
regulating the telecommunications industry.95
NAFTA will eliminate trade barriers and foreign investment restrictions in many
high growth areas of the telecommunication market including software development and
enhanced or value-added services.96 It also offers greater intellectual property rights pro-
tection for telecommunication companies expanding into the Mexican market.97 The
growth of the Mexican economy and the increase in the Mexican telecommunications
capacity as a result of NAFTA consequently will provide substantial market opportunities
for United States firms in Mexico. 98 For instance, the launching of the Solidaridad II
satellite will help companies providing paging, trunking, and cellular services to cover the
entire country.99 Also, private companies in Mexico may use the satellite system to cre-
ate/expand their private networks. These areas are already providing a substantial market
for U.S. products and services. As other countries in Latin America develop their partici-
pation and access into NAFTA, these market opportunities will extend to those growing
economies.
NAFTA's advantages to telecommunication development are in the areas of
reduction and phasing out of tariffs, access to a larger market, access to specialized ser-
vices and industry experts, as well as facilitated mobility of key personnel across national
borders. Further advantages in satellite telecommunication development can be expected
from additional bilateral and regional agreements throughout the Latin American coun-
tries. For instance, Mexico grants preferential import duties for telecommunication
switching equipment to ALADI members. 100 In addition to the United States and
Canada, Mexico also has free trade agreements with Chile, Colombia, Venezuela, Costa
Rica, and Bolivia.10 1
94. Stuart N. Brotman, Counseling Clients on Cross-Border Telecommunications Joint Ventures: A
Summary of Critical Planning Steps and Substantive Legal Areas, Panel on Issues of Cross-
Border Transactions in the 1990's: A Study of Telecommunications Joint Ventures, Annual
Fall/Winter Meeting of the A.B.A. Sec. of Int'l L. & Prac. (Jan. 20, 1994).
95. Id. at 23-24.
96. Id. at 24.
97. Id.
98. Id. Foreign telecommunications companies entering strategic alliances with U.S. firms will
also benefit from the NAFTA, since under NAFTA, North American firms will be allowed to
lease private lines, attach terminal or other equipment to public networks, interconnect private
circuits to public networks and use operating protocols of the user's choice on a nondiscrimi-
natory basis. Id. Further, foreign telecommunications companies will be able to take advan-
tage of enhanced trade under NAFTA because favorable treatment under NAFTA is not con-
fined to the parties. Id.
99. See Mexico - Satellite Communications Equipment, MARKET REPORTS, May 2, 1995.
100. Javier Flores, Telecommunications 5, MEx. TRADE & L. REP. 19,23 (1995).
101. Id.
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The Andean Common Market, ALADI, Mercosur and NAFTA suggest that Latin
American integration is no longer mere rhetoric, but represents real change which can
lead to positive and concrete results in the development of a strong telecommunication
policy for the region.
III. Major Issues Affecting Satellite Telecommunication in Latin America.
Priority issues that industrialized countries should first consider on the agenda
for the development of satellite telecommunication in Latin America, such as privatiza-
tion, competition and deregulation, are not necessarily the most relevant to accomplish
such need. Privatization is only one of several methods of achieving the objectives of
operational efficiency and capital attraction for developing countries.1 02 Investment
capital is needed not to promote a competitive system, but to promote the development
of the telecommunication network infrastructure.1 03 Deregulation is not needed in
most developing countries since they have never had a strict regulatory oversight of
their telecommunication systems. 104 Rather, a priority need is the careful drafting of
explicit telecommunication policies to guide the development of the telecommunica-
tion system. 105
Therefore, a number of essential issues to the telecommunication needs of Latin
American countries require special analysis. Concerns over the appropriate structure and
tasks of a regulatory authority, the appropriate role for competitive and collaborative
forces within an overall regulatory framework, methods for developing useful cost analy-
sis, the design of tariff structures, the analysis of division of revenue principles and
options, and the applicability of experiences in developed countries to developing coun-
tries illustrate just a few important issues.1 06 A brief overview of some of these major
issues follows.
A. NATIONAL POLICY AND REGULATORY PROCESS.
The Latin American telecommunication sector as a whole is in a nascent state. In
each country, the industry is in a different developmental stage under a separate regulatory
scheme. More interesting, however, is that the experiences of each country can be seen as
part of a complete life cycle which could be regulated under a core regulatory scheme.
For example, Brazil is undergoing Phase 1, which is characterized by a govern-
ment run telecommunications company with tremendous unrealized potential. 107 The
102. Id. at 20.
103. Id.
104. Id.
105. Id. at 19.
106. See Flores, supra note 100.
107. See Global Telecom Quarterly Focus - Industry Reports, Latin America, Merrill Lynch Capital
Markets, INVESTEXT, July 31, 1996.
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upside of this stage comes into play as the government cleans up the economy for privati-
zation. 108 Peru is undergoing Phase 2, which lasts for the first three or four years after
privatization, 109 characterized by terrific growth in revenue and cash flow driven by
tremendous line growth and productivity improvement. 110 Argentina is undergoing
Phase 3, achieved when the explosive growth settles into good growth. 111 Mexico is
undergoing Phase 4, when the monopoly expires and long distance revenues get hit
hard.11 2 This stage should be characterized by declining prices and higher marketing
expenses and by the decrease of margins and overall profitability.113 Chile is undergoing
Phase 5, which occurs 12 to 24 months after the introduction of competition."1 4 At this
stage, the sector regains its balance as the key industry players adopt rules for rational,
oligolistic competition.115
The core regulatory regime for telecommunication policy objectives in Latin
America should be based on establishing targets for telecommunication development,
which in turn should measure progress toward achievement of economic, social and
industrial goals, such as the number and percentage of the population with access to the
telecommunication network, growth in system capacity, and the availability of different
kinds of services, including satellite telecommunication. 116
The regulatory authorities in the region should establish operational guidelines
and reporting standards to monitor system expansion and to consider the interests of dif-
ferent user groups, develop strategies to examine problems, and propose changes to poli-
cy objectives when appropriate. 117 In addition, national telecommunication policies in
Latin America need to attempt to achieve multiple objectives, at both the economic and
social levels. 118 Moreover, an effective policy and regulatory process in the area of
telecommunications as a whole is essential to satellite telecommunication development
which in turn will further develop and strengthen Latin America.
B. HUMAN RESOURCE DEVELOPMENT/OPERATIONAL DEFICIENCY.
Policies and institutional arrangements need to be established to nurture the
human resources of Latin American countries. This task involves much more than man-
power training programs since it requires attention to the structure of career and pay
incentives, bureaucratic constraints, and ongoing training and education opportunities
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in the creation of efficient telecommunication entities. Moreover, telecommunication
operating entities must be part of a competitive and effective labor market, which, in the
case of Latin America, is still undergoing major changes. There are shortages of skills at
all levels, including technical, operational, and managerial which frustrate the perfor-
mance of most aspects of telecommunication system improvement and expansion.
120
Further, a failure to employ sound business practices, bureaucratic inertia and undue
political intervention in day-to-day management has often compromised efficiency and
dampened the interest of outside suppliers of human and capital support.
121
Human resource development and operational deficiency is already being
reduced in Latin American countries due to the growth of foreign investment, the
increasing interest in the area as an emerging new market, the importance given to the
area by international organizations, and by the region's access to information technology.
Nevertheless, Latin American countries need assistance and training support
from the industrialized countries that possess them. For example, the U.S.
Telecommunications Training Institute, formed as a result of the 1982 ITU's Nairobi
Plenipotentiary, offers courses on mobile communications in Spanish and English in
wireless communications and spectrum management and on telecommunications plan-
ning and economic decision-making. Institutions such as the Telecommunications
Development Bureau and the WorldTel are the reasonable route under which to channel
this type of support.
C. INVESTMENT CAPITAL.
Improvement of the operational deficiency problem in Latin America is attract-
ing capital to telecommunication system expansion. Newly-enacted foreign investment
policies and regulations are also responsible for this trend. In addition, more Latin
American governments have opted for policies that push for industry liberalization and
deregulation. 122 Direct foreign investment, the most salient of which has been through
privatization, revitalized the public network market, most notably through private con-
cessions and value-added services. 123
Latin America is unique not only in the actual number of privatizations, but in
the scope of these transactions. Generally, governments have sold their majority stake to
mix-investor consortia (groups containing both foreign and local strategic investors), and
the state required these new owners to meet certain performance requirements within a
specified period of time (i.e., increase the number of telephone lines and/or public
phones in the country). 124 In return, Latin American governments have reduced public
debt and generated new investment, while telecommunication companies have expanded
120. ITU Policy, supra note 4, at 23.
121. Id. at 25.
122. See Dialing for Dollars: Telecommunication Sell-Offs Have Investors Buzzing, LATIN FINANCE,
Mar. 1994, at 98.
123. Id., Examples of these include technology such as data-bases, E-mail.
124. Id.
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networks, reduced tariffs and, in general, increased the overall quality and efficiency of
telephone service. 125 Moreover, with the privatization of their telephone systems, Latin
American governments are following a trend to take profits on this valuable asset and
turn telecommunications over to private hands. Further, there are now a number of spe-
cialized regulatory agencies to watch oversee specific areas. For example, in Peru, the
telecommunications regulator OSIPTEL, in operation since 1993, is now playing a key
role in determining the conditions under which trade barriers will affect the telephone
industry in 1998.126
In addition, several measures now provide investment security to foreign
investors which has encouraged capital investment in Latin America. Many Latin
American countries have joined the Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency, a World
Bank Agency, with the purpose of encouraging and protecting investment in those mem-
ber countries. They have also entered into bilateral agreements for the protection of
investments and executed the Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes
between States and National of Other States. OPIC is also playing a role in the security of
investments in the region.
Further, some Latin American countries offer legal guarantees to foreign and
local investors in terms of a stable tax and foreign currency regime and equal treatment
whereby the national legal system will not discriminate against investors based on their
national or foreign participation. In Peru, these guarantees have taken the form of
Stability Agreements, which are contracts entered into by the government and the
investor for a ten or twenty year term.
Another factor influencing capital attraction is foreign exchange availability and
the risk of changes in currency valuations in international currency markets. 12 7 In the
past, many developing countries have been unduly dependent upon foreign exchange for
capital and equipment purchases. 128 More favorable options for obtaining capital from
national and international private and public sources and for establishing more carefully
structured financial arrangements with foreign investors and equipment suppliers are
now becoming possible. 12 9 Examples of this trend are financing through public offerings
usually with two simultaneous trenches, one at the local market and the other interna-
tional. ADRs, ADSs, Eurobonds, 144A placements and other forms are becoming better
known and more frequently used to raise capital throughout Latin America.
Another source of capital for telecommunication development is by way of
international telecommunication organizations. For example, the ITU has created a pri-
vate investment entity for telecommunications infrastructure expansion in LDCs through
WorldTel. The project was sponsored by thirty private and public telecom operators and
is different from other funding and development organizations in that it will be sector-
125. Id.
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specific, focusing only on telecommunications and information technology.130 From the
investor's side, client countries will be required to provide guarantees, risk management
mechanisms and adequate financial structures to safeguard any investments. WorldTel
will be driven by private funding with equity limited to private financial investors.
Governments, telecommunication operators and vendors can take part in projects
through debt and/or equity participation at the project level.
D. EQUITABLE AccESS TO THE GEOSTATIONARY ORBIT.
The exploitation of outer space is perceived to promise unprecedented economic
benefits to the impoverished countries of the Third World. 131 Thus, one of the most
important aspects of telecommunication development for the developing countries is
equitable access to the geostationary orbit (GSO) and the space services utilizing it. All
commercial telecommunications satellites in operation today are geostationary, meaning
they occupy a position in a circular orbit 36,000 kilometers from the earth in the plane of
the earth's equator. 132 In this orbit, a satellite appears stationary vis4-vis the earth since
its period of revolution is equal to the period of the earth's rotation. 
133
However, since the developing countries attempted to become active players in
the formulation and development of international law to regulate outer space activities,
their efforts to establish an international regulatory regime for equitable sharing of
radio frequencies and orbital positions has been vigorously confronted by the devel-
oped countries.
In this context, the objective of the 1988 Space World Administrative Radio
Conference (WARC), attended by over 100 nations and by all of the international organi-
zations with an interest in satellite telecommunication, was to guarantee equitable access
by all countries to the GSO and radio frequency spectrum. 134 The developing countries
wanted to divide the orbit-spectrum resource so that every country in the world would
130. The International Telecommunications Union has released a Feasibility Study, 6 E. EuR. &
FORMER SOVIET TELECOM REP. 3, March 1, 1995. Project sponsors included Ameritech Corp.,
AT&T Corp., Cable & Wireless Plc, NEC Corp, Nokia Oy, Sprint Corp, Teleglobe Inc., Telekom
Malaysia Bhd and Telstra Corp, among others. ITU Fund, supra note 25.
131. See Jakhu, supra note 8.
132. Pamela L. Meredith & Franceska 0. Schroeder, Privately-Owned Commercial
Telecommunications Satellites: Licensing and Regulations by the Federal Communications
Commission, 27 CAL. L. REv. 107, 109 (1990).
133. Id. (citing The International Telecommunications Union (Radio Regulations) Final Acts, World
Administrative Radio Conference, Geneva (1979) at art. I. (defining a geostationary satellite as
"[a] geosynchronous satellite whose circular and direct orbit lies in the plane of the Earth's
equator and which thus remains fixed relative to the Earth?' Id. A geosynchronous satellite is
defined as "[a] n Earth satellite whose period of revolution is equal to the period of rotation of
the Earth about its axis?') Id. (emphasis in original).
134. See ITU Policy supra note 4.
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get a position in the GSO and associated radio frequencies regardless of need for those
resources or current ability to use them. 135 This was to guarantee their future access to
the orbit, since the developing countries were concerned that increasingly intensive use of
the orbit-spectrum resources had been made by developed countries through the late-
1960s to mid-1970s. 136 The developed countries, on the other hand, considered that the
current regime, which was often referred to as "first come, first served" had operated quite
satisfactorily since it had allowed access to everyone who asked to be accommodated, and
no nation had ever been denied access to the GSO.137
WARC was successful in defining an allotment plan for the GSO. Nevertheless,
careful scrutiny of the Final Acts of WARC show that the achievements of the conference
were far short of what the developing countries originally desired. 138 The limitations
imposed by the WARC as to fixed satellite services, nominal positions in a predetermined
arc of the orbit, in addition to problems between the national allotments and the existing
systems, showed that the practice of "first come, first served" still governed space telecom-
munications, and the late-comers were still at the mercy of the first-comers to allow them
to put up their satellite systems. 139 In other words, the late-comers were still at the mercy
of the individual states for gaining access to this international resource. 140 Moreover, at
the ITU's 1994 Plenipotentiary conference, LDCs were still strong on ensuring equitable
access to the radiofrequency spectrum and the geostationary satellite orbit, as well as the
efficient establishment and development of satellite networks.
14 1
As a result of WARC, developing countries started concentrating on subregional
systems, realizing that for most of the developing countries their first satellite systems
would be operating for a region, as opposed to one nation.
14 2
IV. Conclusion.
In order for satellite telecommunication in Latin America to achieve an efficient,
pluralistic and competitive environment, a transformation similar to that which began in
135. The objective of the allotment plan was to guarantee equitable access for developing countries in
the expansion bands, with a period of validity of 20 years or until revised. Id. One part of the
plan was the national allotments, where every country in the world did get a position in the GSO
for use of the expansion bands. Id. The other part of the plan was a network of existing systems,
which were the systems that some developed countries counted on; they were not operative then,
but advance publication within the ITU had been initiated for such systems. Id.
136. Id.
137. Id. Until 1985, equitable access was guaranteed by planning the Fixed Satellite Service (FSS),
which is the standard telecommunications satellite service, or point to point service. Id. In
1985, 90% of the communication satellites operated in the FSS, so this proposal was not a
problem. Id.
138. See Jakhu, supra note 8.
139. Id.
140. Id.
141. See Australian Initiative to Improve ITU's Satellite Coordination Procedures, IAC (SM) PROMPT,
Oct. 28, 1994.
142. Id.
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the United States in 1985 must take place. Latin America needs to eliminate government
monopolies of their telecommunication systems and encourage private participation
within their regulatory framework. This is where the role of the international players
influencing telecommunications in this region is perhaps most useful.
Organizations such as the World Bank, GATT, the OECD, and especially the
ITU's BTD and WorldTel can assist Latin American countries in dealing with a local
bureaucracy which is not yet prepared to address the broader telecommunication issues
affecting the region. These organizations can play an important role in assisting govern-
ment entities and private entrepreneurs to overcome some of the major issues affecting
telecommunication development in Latin America such as the lack of national policy and
regulatory framework that could promote technology intensive projects, the difficulties of
achieving operational efficiency given the limited human resource development, and,
more importantly, the availability of investment capital for such an undertaking.
Also significant to the region are the roles of Intelsat, Inmarsat and Comsat,
especially now that current efforts to privatize Intelsat and Inmarsat threaten to reshape
the almost stable satellite telecommunication balance. Although there is a valid argument
that increased participation of nongovernmental representatives can no longer represent
the interests of a particular country, but instead represent the interests of a commercial
entity as a result of privatization efforts in developing countries, Latin American coun-
tries should also be wary of the long term effects of such privatized structures. The trans-
formation of Intelsat and Inmarsat into commercial corporations would promote effi-
cient products and services because "direct exposure for competitive forces lowers costs,
improves quality, streamlines management and fosters innovation." 143 However, it would
also affect the operations of the new PanAmSat, which is now the largest private interna-
tional satellite provider as a result of its recent merger with Hughes.
Such changes would reform government regulations that currently shape or mis-
shape the international satellite industry. Nevertheless, these changes appear to be posi-
tive since existing regulations are primarily derived from a treaty-based system which has
provided unfair advantages for organizations such as Intelsat and Inmarsat, and not
enough guidelines for operators such as PanAmSat, thereby distorting, rather than pro-
moting, international competition.
Additionally, the existence of regional agreements such as NAFTA and MERCO-
SUR, organizations such as ASETA and the CATT appear to promise an independent
future for Latin America. Latin American satellite communication services are undergo-
ing a period of considerable growth, which will greatly affect the emergence and develop-
ment of regional networks. 144
In the meantime, the countries of Latin America need to become part of restruc-
turing the international satellite telecommunication system, since they can no longer be
considered an outsider to this development.
143. Id.
144. See Wittering, supra note 53.
